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Epoch: Heidegger and the Happening of History 
 
Philip Tonner 
 
Abstract 
This paper offers a reading of the philosophy of Heidegger in terms of the problematic of history as set out by 
&ROOLQJZRRG:H WDNH&ROOLQJZRRG¶V WZRTXHVWLRQV µKRZGLGSHRSOH LQ WKH past derive the meaning of their 
OLYHV"¶DQGµZKDWLVWKHQDWXUHRIKLVWRULFDOGHVFULSWLRQ"¶DVRXUJXLGLQJSULQFLSOHV:HVKRZKRZ+HLGHJJHU¶V
philosophy can be put to use in the service of writing history. Ereignis names that event whereby being (the 
meaningful relatedness of things to human interest and understanding) is revealed and appropriated by historical 
humanity. Ereignis is that event whereby historical civilizations come to be in world history: it is the happening 
of historical civilization. Heidegger claims that the history of being, as he understands it, provides the clue to all 
history. As such, we show how, by way of a reading of the focal artworks representative of particular 
communities, historians can hermeneutically reconstruct the narrative background or meaning of being 
constitutive of particular civilizations. And, it is in terms of this background that individuals can come to endow 
their lives with meaning. We end our piece with a reading of Heidegger on poetry and the poetic function of the 
work of art. Ultimately, Heidegger understands poetry to be the sustaining ground of history. Poetry is 
projective saying and projective saying LV WKDW RULJLQDO µQDPLQJ¶ RI WKLQJV E\ D KLVWRULFDO FRPPXQLW\ ZKLFK
produces the horizons of meaning and meaninglessness constitutive of a historical world. By elucidating 
+HLGHJJHU¶VWKRXJKWRQEHLQJKLVWRU\LQVXFKDZD\DVWRVKRZLWVUHOHYDQFHWRWKHZULWLQJRIKLVWRU\DQGWRWKH
UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRISDVWµPHDQLQJVRIOLIH¶WKLVDUWLFOHFRQVWLWXWHVDFRQWUibution to both Heidegger studies and the 
philosophy of history generally.   
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
7ZRDVSHFWVRIWKHJHQHUDOSUREOHPDWLFRIKLVWRU\PLJKWEHSXWDVIROORZVµKRZGLGSHRSOHLQ
WKHSDVWGHULYHWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHLUOLYHV"¶DQGµZKDWLVWKHQDWXUH RIKLVWRULFDOGHVFULSWLRQ"¶ 
Putting the problem this way brings us into the proximity of the thought of R.G. Collingwood 
but does not commit us to any particular theoretical principles. Recognizing the problematic 
of history is one of the key achievements of modern philosophy. Taking these two questions 
as my point of departure I will, in what follows, outline an answer to each question in terms 
RI WKH SKLORVRSK\ RI 0DUWLQ +HLGHJJHU +HLGHJJHU¶V WKRXJKW LV VXJJHVWLYH RI D QRYHO
historiography which proceeds in a fundamentally interpretive or hermeneutic vein. The 
nature of historical description is fundamentally hermeneutic. I will suggest here that the 
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KLVWRULFDOUHFRUGFDQEHUHDGE\ZD\RID+HLGHJJHULDQUHVSRQVHWR&ROOLQJZRRG¶VTXHVWLRQV
the historical record embodies and in part constitutes the meaning of life for an historical 
FRPPXQLW\DQGKLVWRULFDOGHVFULSWLRQLVEHVWGHVFULEHGDVDQµDUFKDHRORJLFDOKHUPHQHXWLFV¶  
 
In historical discourse it is common to distinguish different periods or epochs in terms of the 
defining characteristics that they share and which differentiates them from other periods. On 
these terms, the ancient era is differentiated from the medieval, the medieval from the modern 
and so on. Each period is an epoch and an epoch is a historically defined configuration of 
meaning in terms of which the historian may characterise (and criticise) individuals, societies 
and civilizations. This concept is thus integral to our specialized discourse about the past. In 
+HLGHJJHU¶V SKLORVRSK\ WKere is an account of the very happening of historical epochs. 
Heidegger names that event ± Ereignis ± whereby historical epochs and their attendant 
FLYLOL]DWLRQVFRPHWREHLQWKHILUVWSODFH,Q+HLGHJJHU¶VWHUPVEreignis is that very granting 
of historical epochs and this event provides for the possibility of human history. Ereignis is 
that revelation and appropriation of meaningful presence which grants historical humans the 
possibility of determining the meaning of their lives. Whole civilizations are themselves 
µHSRFKDO¶ LQ +HLGHJJHU¶V VHQVH RI WKH WHUP DQG KLVWRULFDO GHVFULSWLRQ LWVHOI PXVW UHPDLQ
interpretive. What discovery there is in historical scholarship is mediated in precisely these 
terms. 
 
After his early work Being and Time, from the 1930s on, Heidegger became more and more 
concerned with charting the history of being as it unfolds in the epochs of Western history. At 
this stage in his writings the notion of being has become for Heidegger almost a substitute for 
the term µhistory¶%HLQJLWVHlf means historical intelligibility. Crucially, his notion of history 
is not simply a record of facts or deeds. Rather, this history is bHLQJ¶V RZQ WKDW LV LW LV D
history construed as the historical unfolding of the manifold ways in which things can 
become meaningfully present for individuals or communities.  
 
%HLQJLVIRU+HLGHJJHUWKHPHDQLQJIXOUHODWHGQHVVWKLQJVFDQKDYHIRUKXPDQLW\DQGµLW¶ LV
essentially historical, and understanding the history of being provides for the understanding 
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of all history. %HLQJ¶V KLVWRU\ LV WKH KLVWRU\ RI WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK µKRZ WKLQJV PDWWHU IRU
'DVHLQ¶EHLQJ-there-here-now) is transformed through the unfolding of Western history.  
 
5HDGLQJ +HLGHJJHU¶V WH[WV KLVWRULRJUDSKLFDOO\ LI LW LV SRVVLEOH WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH KLVtorical 
unfolding of the way in which things can be meaningfully present to historical humanity, then 
this would provide the key to the creation of a series of interrelated narratives that present 
human history from the side of meaningful presence. Such narratives would present history as 
more than a mere list of quasi-VXEMHFWLYH DFFRXQWV RI µZKDW KDSSHQHG¶ &RQILJXUDWLRQV RI
meaningfulness would serve as the general framework or epoch unearthed by an 
archaeological hermeneutics. :KLOHWKHWHUPµDUFKDHRORJ\¶PD\EHORQJWR)RXFDXOWLWFDQEH
usefully employed in Heidegger scholarship. )RXFDXOW¶VDUFKDHRORJ\DV*XWWLQJXQGHUVWDQGV
it, attempts to transcend the conscious life of individual subjects, the level of concepts, 
methods and theories, in favour of thH GHSWK GLPHQVLRQ RI WKH µHSLVWHPLF XQFRQVFLRXV¶
EHQHDWK WKH FRQVFLRXV OLIH RI WKH VXEMHFW WKDW PDNHV SRVVLEOH DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V NQRZOHGJH
Heideggerian archaeological hermeneutics approaches the history of being as the depth 
dimension underpinning individuaO 'DVHLQ¶V VHOI-understanding. Archaeological 
hermeneutics proposes that human history (and pre-history) be approached from the point of 
view of an understanding of how the changes in the meaningful presence of things provides 
for novel historical self-interpretation on the part of individuals and communities.  
 
As historical, human beings always inherit a dominant way in which things can be 
meaningful for them. Human beings are appropriated by the way in which things can become 
meaningful for them and the way in which things can become meaningful for them is 
appropriated by human beings: there is a mutual appropriation from both sides. Humans, 
IURP+HLGHJJHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZDUHDSSURSULDWHGE\EHLQJWKHPHDQLQJIXOQHVVRI things) and 
turned into Dasein. Further, for Heidegger, the appropriating event is bound to a particular 
site or place where a people dwell. For historiography, what can be learned from Heidegger is 
WKDW E\ SD\LQJ DWWHQWLRQ WR WKH µHYHQWV¶ ZKLFK HQVKULQH WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK WKLQJV FDQ EH
meaningfully present for members of a group, together with a view of the structure of 
practical agency that is constitutive of the members of that group, the means of writing a 
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novel account of a historical way of life may be achieved.  
 
Heidegger and the Event of History 
 
7KHFHQWUDOFRQFHUQWKDWDQLPDWHVWKHHQWLUHW\RI+HLGHJJHU¶VZULWLQJVLVWKHquestion of the 
meaning of being. Asking this question amounts to asking the question of how and why being 
occurs within human understanding (Sheehan 2003: 105-117)7KHNH\ZRUGVLQ+HLGHJJHU¶V
corpus ± disclosure, emergence, unconcealment, truth, the meaning of being, the truth of 
being ± all refer to the occurrence of being within human experience. Throughout his writings 
Heidegger sought to give an account of how and why disclosure happens for finite human 
being or Dasein (being-WKHUH +HLGHJJHU XQGHUVWDQGV 'DVHLQ WR EH WKDW µFOHDULQJ LQ WKH
IRUHVW¶ WKURXJKZKLFK EHLQJVRUHQWLWLHV VKRZXS LQ WKHLU EHLQJ as ZKDW WKH\DUH'DVHLQ¶V
EHLQJ LV µEHLQJ-in-the-ZRUOG¶ DQG ERWK WKH QRWLRQV RI µVHOI¶ DQG µZRUOG¶ EHORQJ HVVHQWLDOO\
WRJHWKHU LQ WKDW VLQJOH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ ,Q HVVHQFH WKH WHUP µ'DVHLQ¶ GHQRWHV WKDW UHFLSURFDO
interdependence of self and world that Heidegger was keen to stress in his writings.  
 
Self and world belong together in the single entity, the Dasein. 
Self and world are not two beings, like subject and object, or 
like I and thou, but self and world are the basic determination of 
the Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world (Heidegger 1982: 297). 
 
7KHWHUPµEHLQJ¶GHVLJQDWHVQRWVRPHUHPRWHVSKHUHRIH[LVWHQFHEXWUDWKHUWKH meaningful 
presence that entities have for Dasein. Being is fundamentally relative to Dasein and to the 
community in terms of which it understands itself. The event of the occurrence of being for 
Dasein is named by Heidegger Ereignis. Ereignis ± the event of appropriation ± is the 
temporal event of the emergence of meaningful presence, of the way in which things can be 
meaningfully there for a human being. Ereignis is the historically situated appropriation of 
the very meaningfulness of things into the life of a particular individual and/or into the form 
of life of a particular historical community. 
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Now, according to Heidegger, being (or the meaningful presence that things can have) has 
IDOOHQLQWRµREOLYLRQ¶VLQFHWKHWLPHRIWKH$QFLHQW*UHHNV7KLVLVVREHFDXVHWKHontological 
difference between being and beings (between things and their meaningful presence to human 
understanding and interests) has been passed over by the tradition of Western metaphysics. 
The event which produces RUµRSHQV-XS¶WKHRQWRORJLFDOGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQEHLQJDQGEHLQJV
has remained un-thought by the history of metaphysics and it is this event that Heidegger 
attempts to think. This is the Ereignis, the event of appropriation which grants or sends being 
to thought. Through Ereignis, +HLGHJJHUVRXJKWWRµRYHUFRPH¶PHWDSK\VLFVDQGSUHSDUH IRU
ZKDW KH WHUPHG WKH µRWKHU EHJLQQLQJ¶ RI :HVWHUQ KLVWRU\ &KDUDFWHULVWLF RI WKLV µRWKHU
EHJLQQLQJ¶ would be a thought which would be reminiscent of the thought of the Ancient 
Greeks. It would be non-metaphysical and would attempt to pay heed to the Ereignis. 
 
,WLV+HLGHJJHU¶VYLHZWKDWKLVWRULFDOFLYLOL]DWLRQVDUHFRQVWLWXWHGE\SDUWLFXODUUHYHODWLRQVof 
being and his interest came to be bound up with understanding the nature of the epochal shifts 
in the way historical humanity relates to itself, its world and to being. This is reflected in 
+HLGHJJHU¶V XVH RI WKH ZRUG Ereignis to characterize the subject matter of his thought. By 
using this word he wants to suggest a sense of the word eigen (own) which is not actually 
etymologically related to Ereignis but can nevertheless serve to bring a sense of the latter to 
presence (Polt 1999: 146). Eigen is the root of Eigenschaft (property), geeignet (appropriate) 
and eigentlich (authentic). This is why Ereignis LVWUDQVODWHGDVµWKHHYHQWRIDSSURSULDWLRQ¶
Ereignis involves appropriating the historical event of the occurrence of being by individuals 
or communities and a philosophy of Ereignis signals that being is a historical event that 
LQYROYHVµRZQLQJ¶RUDSSURSULDWLRQ%HLQJLVHVVHQWLDOO\ERXQGE\WLPHDQGis historical. And, 
as far as Heidegger is concerned, understanding the history of being provides for the 
understanding of all history. This history of being is a history of the transformations of the 
ways in which things can matter to historical humanity taken as a community. On 
+HLGHJJHU¶VDFFRXQWKXPDQLW\LVµWKURZQ¶LQWRKLVWRU\DQGEHLQJLVWKURZQEDFk to it and the 
µDLP¶RIKLVWRULFDOKXPDQLW\VRIDUDV+HLGHJJHULVFRQFHUQHGLVWRFDWFKZKDWLVWKURZQWRLW
care for and preserve it, and ultimately cast it forward towards its future unfolding. It is 
participation in Ereignis that makes historical humanity Da-sein, the place for the revelation 
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of being.  
 
+HLGHJJHU¶V YLHZ LV WKDW Ereignis, the self-sending of being to thought, is at once 
DFFRPSDQLHG E\ EHLQJ¶V VHOI-withdrawal. This concealment accompanying disclosure is 
inscribed in the essential nature of being itself. There can never be one privileged sending of 
being, a sending where it came into full view and rendered itself transparent. Every historical 
epoch is equally epochal. That is, every epoch is subject to conceptual and existential 
limitation. Human beings have no absolute point of view on things. No one epoch in the 
history of being could ever be privileged.  
 
Cultural Paradigms 
 
2Q+HLGHJJHU¶VDFFRXQWWKHQWKHSUHYDLOLQJPHDQLQJRIEHLQJZKLFKLV thrown to historical 
humanity belongs to LWDV WKHµGHVWLQ\¶RI LWVFRPPXQLW\2QWKHRWKHUVLGHRI WKHHTXDWLRQ
KXPDQLW\µEHORQJV¶WREHLQJ7KHDSSURSULDWLRQRIWKHWZRWHUPVLVPXWXDO7KHHYHQWRIWKH
revelation of being is bound to a particular site or place where a historical people dwell and 
WKHDGYHQWRID QHZZD\RIGZHOOLQJ E\ YLUWXHRID QHZ µGLVSHQVDWLRQ¶RI EHLQJFDQ EH D
traumatic event. As Da-VHLQWKHWDVNVHWIRUDQ\KLVWRULFDOFRPPXQLW\LVWRUHPDLQµVWHDGIDVW¶
in its particular site and avoid becoming complacent and closed off to new possibilities of 
being or dwelling. 
 
In the addendum to his The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger tells us that art belongs to 
appropriation. As such, art plays a crucial role in the very founding of historical civilizations:  
 
Art is history in the essential sense that it grounds history. Art lets 
WUXWK RULJLQDWH« 7KH RULJLQ RI « D SHRSOH¶V KLVWRULFDO H[LVWHQFH LV
DUW«DUWLVE\QDWXUHDQRULJLQDGLVWLQFWLYHZD\LQZKLFKWUXWKFRPHV
into being, that is, becomes historical (Heidegger 1971: 77-78). 
 
Reflected in this view is an interpretation of great art works as events that transform the world 
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of a historical civilization. Such works enshrine the meaning of being constitutive of a 
community and, as such, carry a focal function. Here, in HeideJJHU¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHQDWXUHRI
ZRUNVRIDUW OLHVDQDQVZHUWR&ROOLQZRRG¶VH[LVWHQWLDOTXHVWLRQ LW LVZLWKUHIHUHQFHWRWKH
understandings of things embodied in the work that an agent gleans meanings that become 
constitutive of their identity. Great works of art focus and direct the lives of individuals in a 
FRPPXQLW\*UHDWZRUNVRIµDUW¶VXFKDVD*UHHNWHPSOHRU*RWKLF&DWKHGUDOVHUYHDVZKDW
Dreyfus has called cultural paradigms: such cultural paradigms inaugurate the history of a 
community.  
 
Cultural paradigms define and determine how beings can show up or count for a historical 
FRPPXQLW\ RU FLYLOL]DWLRQ $V 'UH\IXV SXWV LW µ>D@ FXOWXUDO SDUDGLJP FROOHFWV WKH VFDWWHUHG
practices of a group, unifies them into coherent possibilities for action, and holds them up to 
the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of that exemplar (Dreyfus 1993: 
¶ &XOWXUDO SDUDGLJPV DUH WKDW LQ WHUPV RI ZKLFK LQGLYLGXDOV DQG JURXSV GHWHUPLQH WKH
meanings of their lives.  
 
7KH µVFDWWHUHG SUDFWLFHV¶ ZKLFK 'UH\IXV HPSKDVLVHV HPERG\ WKH µFXOWXUDO NQRZ-KRZ¶
GLVSOD\HGE\PHPEHUVRIFRPPXQLWLHV LQWKHLU LQWHUWZLQLQJ OLYHV'UH\IXV¶VH[DPSOH LV WKDW
RI µVRFLDOGLVWDQFLQJ¶ WKHGLVWDQFHDWZKLFKPHPEHUVRIJURXSVWHQGWRVWDQGZKHQQH[W WR
each other varies according to situations and place. For example, agents stand at different 
distances to each other when engaged in friendly conversation or when engaged in aggressive 
argument. Such know-how is a palpable feature of our experience of individual members of 
diverse communities and while we are generally unaware that we have it, it is revealed in the 
PRVWPXQGDQHRIVLWXDWLRQV7RTXRWH'UH\IXV¶VH[DPSOHµLQ1RUWK$IULFDVWUDQJHUVVHHPWR
be oppressively close while in Scandinavia friends seem to stand too faU DZD\¶ 'UH\IXV
1993: 294). Such encounters occasion in us that characteristic uneasiness that causes us to 
move closer or to back away. It is through such responses, Dreyfus contends, that we 
acquired such know-how in the first instance. Through our immersion in our culture over 
WLPH ZH JUDGXDOO\ EHFRPH DEOH WR µJHW LW ULJKW¶ ZLWK UHJDUG WR VRFLDO GLVWDQFLQJ DQG WKXV
acquire the appropriate guidelines constitutive of our culture. Our know-how is not 
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something that we can readily make fully explicit to members of other communities and it is 
precisely in this shared cultural know-KRZ WKDW D KLVWRULFDO FRPPXQLW\¶V LPSOLFLW
understanding of what it means to be a person, thing, plant or animal and member of that 
community is embodied. These shared practices proYLGH WKH µEDFNJURXQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶ LQ
terms of which questions of value and action are decided and it is precisely this background 
understanding of being which produces the clearing in which beings (including other people) 
show up as meaningful and as mattering for us. As Heidegger says: 
 
In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a 
FOHDULQJDOLJKWLQJ«WKHOLJKWLQJFHQWHULWVHOIHQFLUFOHVDOOWKDWLV«
That which is can only be, as a being, if it stands within and stands out 
within what is lighted in this clearing (Heidegger 1971: 53).  
 
The more such implicit know-how is made explicit the more it loses its grip on members of a 
FRPPXQLW\7RWKHH[WHQWWKDWLWUHPDLQVLPSOLFLWLWUHPDLQVWKHµFRQFHDOHGXQPDVWHUHGDQG
XQDUWLFXODWHG¶ background of our activities and life and cultural paradigms, by gathering and 
IRFXVLQJ WKHVH VKDUHG SUDFWLFHV RI D JURXS KDYH DQ µLQWHUSUHWLYH IXQFWLRQ¶ IRU WKHLU
FRPPXQLW\ 6XFK D IXQFWLRQ FRQVWLWXWHV ZKDW +HLGHJJHU PHDQV ZKHQ KH UHIHUV WR µWUXWK
settiQJ LWVHOI WR ZRUN¶ LQ DUW 3DUDGLJPDWLFDOO\ LW LV JUHDW ZRUNV RI DUW ZKLFK HPHUJH DV
cultural paradigms, set truth to work and produce a shared understanding:  
 
6WDQGLQJ WKHUH WKH EXLOGLQJ UHVWV RQ WKH URFN\ JURXQG« 6WDQGLQJ
there, the building holds its ground against the storm raging above it 
DQGVRILUVWPDNHVWKHVWRUPLWVHOIPDQLIHVWLQLWVYLROHQFH«7UHHDQG
grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive 
VKDSHVDQGWKXVFRPHWRDSSHDUDVZKDWWKH\DUH«7KHWHPSOH-work, 
standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world 
back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native 
JURXQG«7KH WHPSOH LQ LWV VWDQGLQJ WKHUH ILUVW JLYHV WR WKLQJV WKHLU
look and to men their outlook on themselves (Heidegger 1971: 42-43).  
 
Such a work opens the clearing in which beings become accessible and intelligible in their 
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being and by so doing, the work realizes the meaning of being constitutive of a world. 
 
Let us consider a medieval example: the Gothic cathedral. Gothic cathedrals started to 
dominate the landscape in Europe from around the middle of the twelfth century and 
continued to do so until the early fourteenth. The Gothic period was only really succeeded in 
the sixteenth century with the advent of Renaissance classicism. Building a Gothic cathedral 
was an act of mass faith and required massive commitment, both financial and existential, on 
the part of the people in a community. One witness to the building of Chartres cathedral in 
the 1140s had this to say regarding the popular support for the project: 
 
:KHQWKHVHIDLWKIXOSHRSOH«VHWRXWRQWKHLUSDWKDPLGWKHEORZLQJ
of trumpets and the waving of banners, it is a marvel to relate that 
their work went so easily that nothing at all could discourage them or 
slow thHP GRZQ QHLWKHU VWHHS PRXQWDLQV QRU UXVKLQJ ZDWHUV «
mature adults and the elderly took on this labor to atone for their sins 
± EXW ZKDW LQVSLUHGHYHQDGROHVFHQWVDQG\RXQJER\V WRSLWFK LQ"«
The vast project begun by the adults will be left for the youth to 
FRPSOHWHDQGFRPSOHWHLWWKH\ZLOOIRUWKH\ZHUHWKHUHWREHVHHQ«
at the church site, they circled their wagons around it like a spiritual 
encampment, and all through the night that followed this army of the 
Lord kept watch with psalms and hymns. Candles and torches were lit 
at every wagon; the sick and hurt were led away and had the relics of 
the local saints brought to them for their healing (Anonymous source 
quoted in Backman 2003: 313).    
 
The event of building these cathedrals amounted to an act of mass worship and it involved the 
entire community. Individual cathedrals bear an essential relationship to the populace of the 
town in which they are situated and in this Chartres was no exception. Since Carolingian 
WLPHVDUHOLFRIWKH9LUJLQ¶VWXQLc had been housed there and in the Romanesque period it had 
VRPHKRZREWDLQHGD µPLUDFXORXV¶ ILJXUHRI WKH 9LUJLQ DQG&KLOG*LYHQ WKHVHFRQQHFWLRQV
the Virgin became the patron of Chartres and protector of the city. By virtue of this special 
relationship, the cause of miracles was ascribed to her relics and Chartres itself prospered as a 
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µWRXULVW¶DWWUDFWLRQIRUSLOJULPDJHV&DONLQV7KHYHU\SUHVHQFHRIWKHFDWKHGUDODW
Chartres brought both spiritual and financial benefits. I argue here that medieval cathedrals 
crystallize for all the transcendent relation of the soul to God as it is expressed in medieval 
theology, philosophy and the experience of life. The medieval cathedral was, to borrow a 
phrase from Backman, a free-standing summa theologica (Backman 2003: 314). 
 
Heidegger was always concerned with the middle ages. He said in 1919 µ, EHOLHYH WKDW , ± 
perhaps more than those who work on the subject officially ± have perceived the values that 
WKH«0LGGOH$JHVEHDUVZLWKLQLWVHOI¶µ/HWWHUWR.UHEV¶cited in Sheehan, 1993: 72). While 
QRW E\ KLV RZQ DGPLVVLRQ DQ µRIILFLDO PHGLHYDOLVW¶ +HLGHJJHU¶V HDUOLHVW SKLORVRSKLFDO
VWLUULQJVKDGRFFXUUHGLQFRQQHFWLRQWR$ULVWRWOH¶VPHGLHYDOFRPPHQWDWRUVDQGVRLWLVE\QR
accident that we choose this example here. Works of architecture, such as the Cathedral at 
Chartres, are cultural paradigms. Such works materially enact the transcendent relation of the 
VRXO WR*RGDUHODWLRQ WKDW LVTXDOLWDWLYHO\ µOLYHG¶ LQ WKH 0LGGOH $JHV7KLVDFFRXQWRI WKH 
spirituDO IXQFWLRQRI WKH&DWKHGUDO LVHQDEOHG E\ +HLGHJJHU¶VDFFRXQWRI WKH Iorm of life of 
µPHGLHYDOPDQ¶  
 
µ$UW¶for Heidegger, is the essence and origin of all particular works of art. Art is a form of 
disclosure (aletheia) and by way of the disclosure characteristic of art what Heidegger called 
WKH µPHDQLQJ RI EHLQJ¶ LQ Being and Time can be determined. Heidegger is not concerned 
ZLWK µILQH DUW¶ rather, KH LV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK µJUHDW DUW¶ 'URQVILHOG   ,Q IDFW VR
Heidegger believes, great art has bHFRPH D µWKLQJ RI WKH SDVW¶ ,W HQGHG DW WKH HQG RI the 
middle ages at the latest. A great work of art is a bringing forth; it is an event that opens up a 
historical world for a historical people. Historical worlds ebb and flow and when they end, 
like the Greek and the medieval worlds have, their great art works are no longer alive because 
WKH\DUHQRORQJHUµRSHQLQJXS¶WKHLUZRUOGVLQWKHRULJLQDU\ZD\WKDWWKH\RQFHGLG:KHUHDV
LQ WKHLU µRULJLQDO VLWWLQJ¶ WKH\ ILUVW JDYH µWR WKLQJV WKHLU ORRN DQG WR PHQ their outlook on 
WKHPVHOYHV¶+HLGHJJHU: 168) when they die they pass into tradition.  
 
The great art work is an event that enshrines the meaning of being that constitutes a historical 
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community. Works of art focus and direct the lives of individuals. Such works put up for 
decision the highest values of a group, what is to count as holy and what unholy. Heidegger 
deliberately widens the concept of great art to include all manner of world defining events 
such as the building of a temple, the convening of a rally or the holding of the Olympic 
Games (Dreyfus 1993; Young 2001: 18). Art is essentially an origin, and works of art reveal 
what ordinarily remains out of sight, namely, the world.  
 
The world is the basis on which the beings/entities that we meet in our experience can be 
involved with one another and with us, and it is our acquaintance with the world in this sense 
that makes it possible for us to be engaged with (act on, think about and even experience) the 
HQWLWLHVWKDWZHHQFRXQWHU7KHµZRUN¶Rf the work of art is to open up or disclose a world in 
order to disclose things in their emergence as what and how they are. Works of art are 
essentially historical.  
 
7KH*RWKLFFDWKHGUDOKDVDSRHWLFVWDWXVLQ+HLGHJJHU¶VVHQVHVLQFHLWFRPSRVHVWKHPHDQing 
of being for a particular historical people. The Gothic style of cathedral, such as the one at 
Chartres, was the dominant style of cathedral in Europe from the middle of the 12th century 
XQWLOWKHHDUO\WK:LWKRXWH[FHSWLRQDFLW\¶VFDWhedral was its largest building. It could be 
seen clearly on the horizon from all around the surrounding area as one approached the city. 
The faithful, when in the nave and facing the main altar, are facing Jerusalem. A nave is 
intersected by a transept, so that the cruciform floor plan dominant in Christian architecture is 
achieved.  
 
On a Heideggerian reading, the Gothic cathedral defines the way in which things can be 
meaningfully present for members of a community: in their focal function, these works set 
out the tasks implicit in being a member of that community. The work of art provides a 
narrative schema that enables individuals to incorporate their own life stories into the larger 
narrative of their community as it unfolds historically. I wish here to link this interpretation to 
+HLGHJJHU¶VRWKHUWKHRUHWLFDOZULWLQJV and to his account of the analogy of being.  
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In the Scotus Book, his postdoctoral dissertation, and elsewhere, Heidegger clearly links 
analogical thinking to the fundamental experience of the world and to the intrinsically 
hierarchical thinking of medieval thought as RQWRWKHRORJ\µWKHGLVFLSOLQHWKDWFODVVLILHVDQG
explains beings in general and subordinates WKHPWRDVXSUHPHEHLQJ¶3ROW 144).  
 
There are three broad kinds of analogical reasoning in Western philosophy: analogy of 
proportionality, analogy of attribution and analogy of participation (Ashworth 2013: 1-2). 
$QDORJ\RISURSRUWLRQDOLW\RSHUDWHVLQWHUPVRIDVLPLODULW\RIUHODWLRQV7KXVE\DQDORJ\µ$
LVWR%¶DVµ&LVWR'¶VRWKHWHUPµLQWHOOLJHQFH¶LVXVHGDQDORJLFDOO\LQWKLVVHQVHZKHQZH
VD\WKDWµWKHGRJ¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHLVWRWKHGRJDVWKHPDQ¶VLQWHOOLJHQFHLVWRWKHPDQ¶$QDORJ\
of attribution involves a relation between two things where one is primary and the other 
secondary. The classic example of this kind of analogy is to do with health: that is, the term 
µKHDOWK\¶ LV DQDORJLFDO ZKHQ DSSOLHG WR DQ LQGLYLGXDO DQG WKDW LQGLYLGXDO¶V PHGLFDWLRQ WKH
individual has health in the primary sense and the medication secondarily in that it 
FRQWULEXWHVFDXVDOO\WRWKHKHDOWKRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO,QWKHVHWHUPVWKHWHUPµKHDOWK¶KDVDIRFDO
IXQFWLRQ LW LV WKH IRFDO FHQWUH RI DOO LQVWDQFHV RI µKHDOWK¶ WKH PDQ LV KHDOWK\ LQ WKH
primary/focal sense; his diet is healthy in that it promotes health; his activity is healthy in that 
it promotes health and so on.  
 
Analogy of participation operates in terms of the similarity of God and His creatures: so, 
*RG¶VFUHDWXUHVDUHZLVHEHFDXVHWKHLUFUHDWXUHO\ZLVGRPLPSHUIHFWO\UHIOHcts the wisdom of 
God (Ashworth 2013: 1-2). The medieval scholastic philosophers established what they 
FDOOHG WKH µGHJUHHVRI EHLQJ¶ LQ WHUPVRIDQDQDORJ\ EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRI EHLQJV WKH
highest being in these terms was the divine being (summum ens) whose actuality contains no 
potentiality and whose essence is identical with its existence. 
 
+HLGHJJHU¶V YLHZ LV WKDW WKH FRQFHSWXDOO\ ULFK DQG DEVWUDFW SKLORVRSKLHV RI WKH PLGGOH DJH
H[SUHVVWKHµIRUPRIOLIHRIPHGLHYDOPDQ¶+HLGHJJHU¶+HVD\V 
 
 
ISSN 1393-614X  
Minerva - An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 19 (2015): 132-150 
 
____________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
144 
          Philip Tonner 
the concept of analogy «DSSHDUVDWILUVWJODQFHWREHDQXWWHUO\IDGHG
and no longer meaningful schoolbook concept. However, as the 
dominant principle in the categorial sphere of sensible and 
supersensible reality, it contains the conceptual expression of the 
qualitatively filled and value-laden experiential world of medieval 
man that is related to transcendence. It is the conceptual expression of 
the particular form of inner Dasein that is anchored in a primordial, 
transcendent relation of the soul to God and lived precisely in the 
Middle Ages with an unusual reserve (Heidegger 2002: 67). 
 
The analogy of being, most associated with St Thomas Aquinas, is the conceptual 
crystallization of the relation of the soul to God as this was lived in the middle ages: analogy 
is the crystallization of the understanding of being in medieval life. Now, it can be said that 
the distinct vertical lines that abound in Gothic architecture are possessed of the spiritual 
IXQFWLRQRIGUDZLQJWKHVSHFWDWRU¶VVSLULWKHDYHQZDUGWRZDUGV*Rd and if so this relates the 
cathedral to the vertical thinking of the doctrine of analogy and to the ontotheological 
enterprise. The Gothic cathedral materially enacts the transcendent relation of the soul to God 
as this is crystallized in the philosophy of analogy. The gothic cathedral is an ontotheological 
object. All art is essentially poetry for Heidegger and so we should say that the Gothic 
FDWKHGUDO¶VSRHWLFVWDWXVLQ+HLGHJJHU¶VVHQVHLVWKDW LWcomposes the meaning of being for a 
particular historical people. Such a work opens the clearing in which beings become 
accessible and intelligible in their being. The work realizes the meaning of being constitutive 
of a given civilization and the focal function of the work is analogous to the focal function of 
the focal being in the philosophy of analogy: the work provides the focal narrative or 
narrative centre for the narrative unfolding of the lives of those that live in the space opened 
by it. The existential orientation of individuals in communities can be determined by analogy 
to the focal function of the work of art. In realizing the meaning of being for a civilization, 
the work of art gathers together the interpretive network in terms of which all beings, 
including human beings, are what they are. Dasein and the entire network of the ready-to-
hand acquire their meaning and so being in terms of this contextual circuit focused on the 
orienting work of art or cultural paradigm.  
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Ultimately, Heidegger holds that what comes to pass in the middle ages with the philosophy 
RIDQDORJ\LVVXERUGLQDWHGWRWKHXQIROGLQJGUDPDRIEHLQJ¶VKLVWRULFDORFFXUUHQFHLQ:HVWern 
history. Gothic cathedrals materialize the medieval experience of being in stone. They 
materialize the transcendent relation of the soul to God as it is expressed in medieval 
theology. All great art has such a poetic function whereby it composes the meaning of being 
characteristic of an age. Such material compositions focus and direct the lives of the 
individuals who live in their shadow.  
 
World, Earth and an Example of Description 
 
In The Origin of the Work of Art Heidegger introduces the notion of earth to complement his 
FRQFHSWRIZRUOGZKHUHD µZRUOG¶PHDQVDFRQWH[WRI VLJQLILFDQFH'DVHLQDVEHLQJ-in-the-
world, is inseparable from such a context. In many ways, world means much the same as 
culture: it is a historically-defined configuration of meaning in terms of which a Dasein 
XQGHUVWDQGV LWVHOI (DUWK E\ FRQWUDVW LV WKH µP\VWHULRXV VRXUFH¶ IURP ZKLFK EHLQJV DULVH
Reading world as culture, a context of significance which enables the self-understanding and 
contextual/environmental understanding of a community, earth can be read as nature, the 
autonomous pre-cultural ground for culture which tends to resist the cultural impulse (Polt 
1999: 137). Earth is the autonomous power of nature (physis) which is beyond the control of 
mortal humanity. Between the two, world and earth, culture and nature, there is essentially a 
FRQIOLFWRUµVWULIH¶ 
 
World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are 
never separated. The world grounds itself on the earth, and earth juts 
WKURXJK ZRUOG« 7KH ZRUOG LQ UHVWLQJ XSRQ WKH HDUWK VWULYHV WR
VXUPRXQWLW«7KHHDUWKKRZHYHUDVVKHOWHULQJDQGFRQFHDOLQJWHQGV
always to draw the world into itself and keep it there. The opposition 
of world and earth is a striving (Heidegger 1971: 48-49).  
 
1RZLW LV+HLGHJJHU¶VYLHZWKDWJUHDWZRUNVRIDUWVXFKDVWKH*RWKLFFDWKHGUDOHPERG\RU
accomplish WKHVWULIHEHWZHHQZRUOGDQGHDUWK*UHDWZRUNVRIDUWµVHWXS¶DZRUOGDQG µVHW
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IRUWK¶WKHHDUWKDQGLQVWLJDWHWKHVWULIHEHWZHHQWKHWZRµ6HWWLQJXSDZRUOGDQGVHWWLQJIRUWK
WKHHDUWKWKHZRUNDFFRPSOLVKHVWKLVVWULYLQJ¶+HLGHJJHU 
 
Artworks establish a historical world and at the same time allow the earth to come to 
presence as something which resists the will of mortal humanity. The world dimension of a 
work solicits its community to render its cultural dimension wholly explicit and all-
encompassing and the earth dimension of the work is precisely that dimension which resists 
this totalization: earth is the self-concealing dimension of things and by remaining concealed 
WKHHDUWKGLVFORVHVWKHOLPLWVRIKLVWRULFDOKXPDQLW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 
 
Artworks as cultural paradigms embody the strife between earth and world. Heidegger also 
held there to be nihilistic paradigms that conceal the struggle between earth and world. Such 
SDUDGLJPVRYHUHPSKDVL]HKXPDQLW\¶VDELOLW\WRPDVWHUDQGFRQWUROWKHLUZRUOGDQGWKHHDUWK
'UH\IXV+HLGHJJHU¶VH[DPSOHLVa power station. Such paradigms are totalising 
in the sense that they point to the eventual domination and subordination of all that has to 
date resisted human control. Non-nihilistic cultural paradigms such as the Greek temple or 
Gothic cathedral are not WRWDOLVLQJLQWKLVVHQVHEHFDXVHWKH\VHWRXWWKHOLPLWVRIKXPDQLW\¶V
possible domination and ordered control of the world and of the earth. Non-nihilistic cultural 
paradigms set forth the earth.  
 
As noted, for Heidegger, all art is essentially poetry. This poetic status must be construed in 
the broadest possible terms. The Gothic cathedral has a poetic status in the sense that it 
composes the being of beings for a historical people (Guignon 1993: 23). Gothic architecture 
in particular and religious art generally is adorned with vastly elaborate religious symbolism. 
The rose window, which dominates the façade of most Christian buildings, serves to bring to 
presence a sense of the Virgin Mary to the initiated. The rose, a powerful symbol in 
Christianity, iVDIWHUDOOµWKHPRVWEHDXWLIXORIIORZHUV¶6XFKV\PEROLVPQRWRQO\VHUYHVDQ
aesthetic function but also a mythopoeic one. Such symbolism embodies the stories which 
communities tell themselves about themselves. Poetry, less broadly conceived as linguistic 
DUWKDVSULRULW\DPRQJWKHDUWVJHQHUDOO\LQ+HLGHJJHU¶VWKRXJKWVLQFHLWGUDZVRQDQGKDVD
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special relationship with the folkloric and ritualistic practices of a historical people: 
 
7KH OLQJXLVWLF ZRUN RULJLQDWLQJ LQ WKH VSHHFK RI WKH SHRSOH «
tranVIRUPV WKH SHRSOH¶V VD\LQJ VR WKDWQRZ HYHU\ OLYLQJ ZRUG ILJKWV
the battle and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy 
(Heidegger 1971: 43).  
 
7KLV EDFNJURXQG µVD\LQJ¶ Sagen) of a people includes their proverbs, anecdotes, oral 
traditions, customs, rituals and festivals and, so construed, poetry has a deep connection with 
the form of life RIDKLVWRULFDOFXOWXUH3RHWU\LVµ«WKHSULPDOODQJXDJHRIDKLVWRULFDOSHRSOH¶
(Heidegger 2000: 60) and as such poetry sustains and grounds history.  
 
Precisely because artworks, linguistic and otherwise, can put up for decision the ultimate 
YDOXHVRIDFRPPXQLW\ZKDWLVKRO\DQGZKDWXQKRO\LQ+HLGHJJHU¶VWHUPVDUWZRUNVKDYHD
political role in founding the very existence of historical communities. By way of a 
hermeneutic reading of the foundational artworks characteristic and constitutive of a given 
epoch, the historian and archaeological hermeneut can reconstruct the narrative background 
that forms the basis of self-interpretation in a given historical community. Such a method of 
historical description is a form of reconstructive or archaeological hermeneutics and it digs 
the epistemic unconscious.  
 
Conclusion 
 
7R FRQFOXGH OHW XV EULHIO\ UHWXUQ WRRQH RI &ROOLQJZRRG¶V TXHVWLRQV 5HFDOO &ROOLQJZRRG
asked µKRZ GLG SHRSOH LQ WKH SDVW FRQVWUXFW WKH PHDQLQJV RI WKHLU OLYHV"¶ $QVZHULQJ WKLV
question from a Heideggerian point of view will emphasise the role of cultural paradigms. As 
ZH KDYH VHHQ RQ +HLGHJJHU¶V DFFRXQW SRHWU\ DV WKH SULPDO ODQJXDJH RI D SHRSOH, is the 
RULJLQDO µQDPLQJ¶ RI WKLQJV DQG DOO DUW LV HVVHQWLDOO\ SRHWU\ 7KLV RULJLQDO QDPLQJ DOORZV
things to show up as meaningful in a particular historical context for a particular community 
of individuals. Poetry is projective saying and such saying produces the rules or structures 
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that enable the showing up of things as meaningful. Saying also produces the conditions of 
meaninglessness for a community: saying determines precisely that which cannot show up as 
meaningful or sayable for a community:  
 
Projective saying is poetry: the saying of world and earth, the saying 
of the arena of their conflict and thus of the place of all nearness and 
UHPRWHQHVV RI WKH JRGV« 3URMHFWLYH VD\LQJ LV VD\LQJ ZKLFK LQ
preparing the sayable, simultaneously brings the unsayable as such 
LQWRDZRUOG,QVXFKDVD\LQJ WKHFRQFHSWVRIDQKLVWRULFDOSHRSOH¶V
nature, i.e., of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, 
before it (Heidegger 1971: 74).  
 
Poetry as projective saying is precisely that which enables individuals the chance to co-
determine the meaning of their world and their lives in terms of the historical unfolding of 
being. Ereignis constitutes historical epochs. The meaning of epoch is that each mutual 
appropriation of historical humanity and the meaQLQJIXO SUHVHQFH RI µEHLQJ¶ LV DOVR D
withdrawal of being. One aspect of being, one set of rules or structures, is revealed to and 
appropriated by a particular community, so another withdraws and is shrouded in darkness. 
An absolute all-encompassing point of view cannot be reached: all historical communities are 
equally epochal. The archaeological hermeneut attempts to describe the meanings and 
structures constitutive of any community. Individuals and groups interpret the 
meaningfulness of their own lives in conjunction with the meaningfulness of the manifest 
phenomena of the world and this is accomplished in terms of the prevailing meaning of being 
FRQVWLWXWLYHRQDQDJH,W LVRQWKHEDVLVRI WKLV µPHDQLQJDQGJURXQGRIEHLQJV¶ WKDW WKLQJV
can become meaningful at all.  
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